Article III, Section 2, Exceptions Clause Canadian Constitutional Parallels: Canada Teaches the United States an American History Lesson by Swan, George Steven
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2, EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PARALLELS:




Congress has recently considered implementing restrictions on
the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, including the Supreme
Court, under the Exceptions Clause' of article III, section 2. The
following discussion will delineate the misgivings of prominent
American legal critics concerning the proposed restrictions, which
they believe may result in a checkerboard or patchwork quilt con-
stitution or bill of rights. Three issues will be raised in perspective
of these misgivings: (1) whether a checkerboard constitution (or
bill of rights) contradicts the basic premises of federalism; (2)
whether the framers and ratifiers of article III actually envisioned
such a checkerboard constitution; and, (3) whether such an envi-
sioning thereof on their part actually attracted them to the Excep-
tions Clause.
It will be shown that during the evolution of Canada (also a
primarily common law, federal nation-state), a similar prospect for
a Canadian checkerboard Constitution through 1981 and 1982 was
exemplified. It will be demonstrated that the newly patriated Ca-
nadian Constitution embraces new guarantees of freedoms
analagous to such guarantees in the United States Bill of Rights
and fourteenth amendment. Also, it will be seen that this newly
patriated Canadian instrument embraces a Notwithstanding Clause
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I. The Exceptions Clause provides that "the Supreme Court shall have appellate Juris-
diction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make." U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2. Analyses of the proposed restrictions
mentioned in the text are found in Oversight Hearings to Define the Scope of the Senate's
Authority under Article I1 of the Constitution to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1982). For further discussion on "court stripping" see generally Congressional Limits on
Federal Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 893-1076 (1982).
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which is not dissimilar to the Exceptions Clause of article III, sec-
tion 2.
These Canadian current events are measured against the pe-
riod of the framing of the United States Constitution and Bill of
Rights to reveal that both eras embraced a "go-it-alone" option se-
riously weighed by one or more major units in the federal system.
Also, both eras embraced an enunciated constitutional unit veto
over the two new constitutional instruments in 1787 America and
1982 Canada respectively. This enunciation was more clear in the
American instance. United States lawyers can easily comprehend
(given interprovincial and provincial-federal tensions) the 1982 in-
clusion of the Notwithstanding Clause in the Canadian Constitu-
tion, not despite, but because of the prospect of a checkerboard
constitution. Therefore, American attorneys can more readily ac-
cept that the 1787 inclusion in article III, section 2 of the Excep-
tions Clause was actually desired by framers who (given interstate
and anticipated state-federal tensions) welcomed the option of a
checkerboard constitution, to be chosen if necessary.
I. AN AMERICAN CHECKERBOARD CONSTITUTION
The perceived danger of a congressional restriction of the ju-
risdiction of the Supreme Court producing a checkerboard consti-
tution interpreted differently from state to state has alarmed
numerous legal commentators. Many have quoted the words of Al-
exander Hamilton in Number 80 of The Federalist papers:2
The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the na-
tional laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of
final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same
laws, is a hydra in government from which nothing but contra-
diction and confusion can proceed.3
As the former president of the American Bar Association
(ABA), Robert W. Meserve, argued during 1982:
Despite all the efforts of state judges to apply federal law
accurately, having fifty different judicial systems determine these
questions will result in a broad lack of uniformity of decision in
cases in which basic rights should be protected. The final conse-
quence of the delay and lack of uniformity will be that the public
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 406 (A. Hamilton) (M. Beloffed. 1948). Applying this
passage to article III, § 2, "checkerboard constitution" disputes is to invoke it slightly off-
point. Hamilton is arguing generally "the propriety of the judicial power of a government
being coextensive with its legislative" power. Id.
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will lose confidence in the administration of justice and will no
longer feel able to rely on the Constitution as a rational source of
protection for basic rights.
The current president of the ABA, David R. Brink, during 1982,
agreed with Meserve: "At best, we would have fifty federal consti-
tutions--one for each state";5 and again: "I cannot believe that
any American today really wants a league of states rather than a
nation.'"6
ABA Young Lawyers Division Chairperson C. Edward
Dobbs, during 1982, joined in the Meserve and Brink worries over
jurisdictional restrictions upon the federal judiciary, including the
Supreme Court, primarily due to Dobbs' fears of a checkerboard
constitution:
[B]y stripping the Supreme Court of its authority to pass upon
constitutional issues, the Constitution would be reduced to a
hodgepodge of inconsistent interpretations by the state courts,
and the scope and extent of constitutional rights would vary de-
pending upon one's place of residence. As Chief Justice John
Marshall noted in 1821, "The necessity of uniformity, as well as
correctness in expounding the Constitution and laws of the
United States, would itself suggest the propriety of vesting in
some single tribunal the power of deciding, in the last resort, all
4. Meserve, Limiting Jurisdiction and Remedies of Federal Courts, 68 A.B.A.J. 159, 161
(1982).
5. Brink, Necessity Must Yieldto the Constitution, 21 JUDGES' J., Winter 1982, at 12, 15.
"This has become one of the most significant issues of Mr. Brink's presidency, one on which
he has focused a great deal of attention." Correspondence with ABA Assistant Staff Director
Nancy Cowger Slonim (Apr. 30, 1982).
6. Brink, supra note 5, at 15. Brink wrote:
Abraham Lincoln strongly disagreed with the Dred Scott decision of the
United States Supreme Court. Yet he said of the Court: "We think its decisions on
constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particular
cases decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by
amendments of the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself. More than
this would be revolution."
Id. Brink quotes but does not cite A. LINCOLN, Speech at Springield, Illinois (June 26, 1858),
reprinted in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 398, 401 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
Meserve had quoted the same Lincoln paragraph more fully. Meserve, supra note 4, at 161.
Brink and Meserve's readers would believe Lincoln felt that the Dred Scott opinion was
"fully settled" and should therefore be obeyed; yet on the same page Lincoln asserts that
because Dred Scott is wanting in "claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not
factious, it is not even disrespectful to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled
doctrine for the country." Id Lincoln exactly two weeks later would say: "If I were in
Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in
a new territory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should." A. LINCOLN,
Speech at Chicago, Illinois (July 10, 1858), reprinted in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN 484, 495 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (emphasis added).
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cases in which they are involved."7
In 1982, John Shattuck and David Landau, both of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, concurred in these ABA fears:
The judicial crisis created by this legislation would be com-
pounded, not reduced, by the fact that state courts would remain
open to hear cases involving constitutional issues removed by
Congress from the federal courts. Instead of one "law of the
land," there would be fifty different interpretations of what the
national Constitution requires. State and local judges and offi-
cials will see this as a signal that they need not follow the rules
and principles developed by the federal judiciary to give nation-
wide meaning to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.8
These 1982 concerns of the official legal establishment and le-
gal practitioners merely echo those long since expressed by legal
scholars. William W. Van Alstyne, in 1973, averred that:
[T]he general inexpediency of a headless inferior federal judici-
ary or an array of final state courts-brought about by lopping
off the means of reconciling conflicting interpretations of na-
tional law and of the Constitution short of the Supreme Court-
must not be discounted as a major restraining influence upon the
practical use of the exceptions clause.9
Irving Brandt during that same year admitted that the Excep-
tions Clause of article III, section 2:
appears to confer unlimited power upon Congress to take away
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Under that in-
terpretation it would be possible to deny litigants Supreme Court
review in cases involving bills of attainder, ex post facto laws,
freedom of speech, press and religion, unreasonable search and
seizure, equal protection of the laws, right to counsel, and com-
pulsory self-incrimination. In short, Congress could blot out the
entire Bill of Rights, so far as the establishment of nationwide
judicial standards is concerned. Could the framers of the Consti-
tution have intended to vest Congress with such power of whole-
sale destruction?' 0
During 1965, the widely-respected Professor Herbert Wechsler
7. Dobbs, Don't Strip Court oAuthority to Pass Upon Constitutional Issues, 9 BARRIS-
TER, Winter 1982, at 2.
8. Shattuck & Landau, Court-Stripping A New Way to Rewrite the Constitution, 21
JUDGES' J., Winter 1982, at 16, 18.
9. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 269
(1973).
10. Brandt, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53
ORE. L. REV. 3, 5 (1973).
Vol. 13
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of Columbia University School of Law expressed his misgivings
over the checkerboard resolution of issues if all federal jurisdiction
is withdrawn, inasmuch as "the resolution is perforce left to the
courts of fifty states, with . . . greater probability of contrariety in
their decisions. How long would you expect such inconsistency in
the interpretation of the law of the United States to be regarded as
a tolerable situation?"''
Limitations on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
had already been protested, relative to the possibility of checker-
board federal constitutional rights:
If the federal courts were not open to protect these rights,
federal constitutional guarantees would be at the mercy of the
states, with the result that a constitutional right might be recog-
nized in one state and not in another. Then the action on the
part of Congress, rendering the federal courts powerless to pro-
tect these rights and secure uniform treatment for the parties
seeking to assert them, would seem to offend due process.'
2
With myriad warnings in the legal literature against the sup-
posed menace of a checkerboard constitution, it is little wonder that
even the general public could read in the mass circulation press by
1982:
Should Congress prevail, cases involving social issues would be
left to state courts. That is hardly comforting, least of all to the
state courts; the chief judges of all fifty have urged Congress to
reject the court-stripping bills. The results could be a whittling
away of individual rights as well as a judicial hodgepodge. The
Constitution, warns Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, "will
mean one thing in Maine and another in Arkansas."'
13
The foregoing lengthy chain of cautions against a checker-
board constitution is presented to highlight dramatically the fears
hitherto expressed within the profession over this point. Is a check-
erboard constitution (or at least, a checkerboard bill of rights) so
absurd as to be inconsistent with the logic of democratic federal-
ism? Could an article III, section 2 provision for a checkerboard
constitution have been in the front of the minds of the framers and
ratifiers of our Constitution of 1787? If so, could that article III,
section 2 provision for a checkerboard constitution unequivocably
11. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965).
12. Note, Limitations on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 20 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 99, 114 (1958).
13. Press, Congress's Court Strippers, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 1982, at 67.
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have proved an actual asset thereof in the appraisal of its framers
and ratifiers?
II. A CANADIAN CHECKERBOARD CONSTITUTION
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in early No-
vember 1981, confronted various provincial governments opposing
his own federal government's efforts to patriate the Canadian Con-
stitution from the United Kingdom to Canada. 4 One critical issue
in the years-long friction over patriating a new constitution for Ca-
nada had been the proposed post-patriation amendment processes,
including the problem of whether a province would be allowed to
"opt out" from application of any of those subsequent, post-patria-
tion amendments.
Prime Minister Trudeau was reported in a prominent sector of
the Canadian press to object to any prospective checkerboard con-
stitution for his nation:
There is an . ..important principle at stake. As the country's
made-in-Canada constitution (assuming it is brought home)
evolves in the years ahead to meet new challenges and changing
circumstances, should the document embody a single set of na-
tional values for all citizens or should it be a constitution that
varies from province to province?
Trudeau's answer has always been unequivocal. He does
not want a "checkerboard Canada."
The provinces have been equally firm. They don't want a
constitution so inflexible that it doesn't respond to each region's
special needs and values.15
As it transpired, Prime Minister Trudeau would ultimately ac-
cept a patriated Canadian Constitution which, in American terms,
14. "One of Trudeau's chief goals in seeking a home-grown constitution was to
strengthen Canada's relatively weak central government. That was precisely why he faced
stubborn opposition from the country's ten provincial premiers, who retain primary control
over natural resources, education and health." A Symbol of Sovereignty, TIME, Apr. 26,
1982, at 41.
15. Goar, Vancouverplan returns to haunt Trudeau, Toronto Star, Nov. 4, 1981, at A16,
col. 6. In the event that the Notwithstanding Clause ultimately was added to Canada's new
Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
It raised the possibility that Prime Minister Trudeau had always dreaded in public,
of a "checkerboard quilt" of human rights throughout Canada in which some rights
might be in force, at any one time, in one province but not in another. The legal
spectre thus emerged of the condition described by Voltaire in his depiction of
eighteenth-century France: one changed one's law every time one changed one's
horse in traveling from one part of the country to another.
E. MCWHINNEY, CANADA AND THE CONSTITUTION 1979-1982: PATRIATION AND THE
CHARTER OF RIGHTS 97 (1982).
Vol. 13
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1983], Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol13/iss1/10
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PARALLELS
expressly allows for a state-by-state checkerboard bill of rights.' 6
As to this point the Prime Minister would recognize: "Some things
were given up in order to constitutionalize the amending process.
The things that I gave up-some of them made me sad."' 7
III. PARALLEL UNITED STATES/CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES
The signature of Queen Elizabeth II to the Constitution Act,
1982 (this in her capacity as Queen of the United Kingdom), 18 and
her proclamation that brought into force the Constitution Act, 1982
(this in her capacity as Queen of Canada)' 9 on April 17, 1982, was
16. This is true not only of the document as currently written, but relative also to subse-
quent amendments:
Among whereases and notwithstandings in the rest of the 60-section act, there
are seeds for flowers-and for weeds. An amending formula that eluded politicians
nine times since 1927 now permits constitutional changes in Canada with the ap-
proval of Parliament and seven provinces, representing 50 per cent of the popula-
tion. But up to three legislatures can opt out, producing a scenario for the
checkerboard Canada that Trudeau once lamented.
Lewis, Rebirth of a Nation, MACLEANS, Apr. 26, 1982, at 30.
The New Constitutional resolution encompasses these main elements:
Essentially the same Charter of Rights that was hammered out by the special
joint parliamentary committee last winter but it now has been made subject to a
legislative override clause that allows Parliament and provincial assemblies to pass
legislation contradicting the charter on fundamental, legal and equality rights.
An amending formula worked out by eight provinces (including Quebec) last
spring through which seven provinces representing 50 per cent of the population
and the federal Government could bring about constitutional change. Under this
formula as many as three provinces could opt out of future changes that affected
their rights, boundaries or powers.
Sheppard, Won't abandon Quebec, PM says ofconstitution, Globe and Mail (Toronto), Nov.
19, 1981, at 1, 2, col. 5.
17. Gray, Resolution is unveiled, but Trudeau is bitter at compromises, Globe and Mail
(Toronto), Nov. 19, 1981, at I, col. 5.
The compromise deal allows the Trudeau government to set up a new constitu-
tion, including a controversial bill of rights and an amending formula for making
future changes to the constitution. But it also allows the provinces to nullify the bill
of rights provisions within their own boundaries if they so want.
The arrangement was a stunning compromise for Mr. Trudeau, who in the past
has rejected these so-called opting out provisions as likely to create a "checker-
board Canada" where fundamental civil and democratic rights are guaranteed in
some provinces but not in others.
Even so, winning a deal at this conference is seen as a great triumph for Mr.
Trudeau, who precipitated the current crisis last fall by saying he would write a
new Canadian constitution without the help of the 10 provinces.
Milne, Trudeau gets go-ahead to write a new constitution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Nov. 6, 1981,
at 4, col. 2.
18. CAN. EMBASSY PUB. AFFAIRS Div., THE ROLE OF THE MONARCHY AND THE CANA-
DIAN CONSTITUTION (Apr. 1, 1982).
19. Id Nonetheless, a British legal scholar's characterization of the Queen might not be
fully in accord with the characterization of her by the Canadian Embassy:
To say that the Queen is Queen of Canada is not quite correct. She is Queen of all
7
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almost simultaneous with the April 1982 American popular reports
about the weighing by Congress of the proposed article III initia-
tives.2' This newly Canadianized federal constitution embraces sa-
lient features familiar in outline to United States attorneys.
The Constitution Act, 1982, encompasses, inter alia, the new
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2' An American lawyer
might style section 2 of this justiciable22 Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms 23 the Canadian first amendment:
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom
of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opin-
ion and expression, including freedom of the press and other me-
dia of communication; (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and,
(d) freedom of association.24
An American lawyer might denominate section 7 of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms the Canadian Due Process
Clause: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accord-
ance with the principles of fundamental justice."25
A United States attorney might characterize section 10 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as the Miranda
26
the territories that admit allegiance to her; she is one Queen and not a score of
queens. This may read like metaphysics, but in fact metaphysics has been avoided.
The Queen is a person and not an institution, and so she is one Queen. She has a
score or more of governments, governing in her name.
I. JENNINGS, THE QUEEN'S GOVERNMENT 37 (rev. ed. 1967).
20. Press, supra note 13, at 67.
21. "The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." CAN. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, § 1. The Char-
ter has been called the "carta canadiana." Beaudoin, The "Patriation" of the Canadian Con-
stitution 6 (Feb. 21, 1982)(unpublished manuscript).
22. The Charter-with its lofty and often inspiring litany of high principles and
protections-will soon be required reading for generations of proud schoolchildren.
But, in the short haul, since the perplexed courts must spell out what those general
rights mean in practical terms, the document has also spawned a thriving cottage
industry for the legal profession. Litigation will spread like wildfire. Legal pro-
ceedings may balloon with intricate arguments and novel cases may mushroom.
Janigan, For this is the law and the profits, MACLEANS, Apr. 26, 1982, at 34.
23. The Charter will enable the courts to determine whether a federal or provincial
law is commensurate with it and to declare inoperative any legislative measures
that contravene it. The criterion is that which "can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society." The rights and freedoms can be limited only by rule
of law, within limits that are reasonable and that can be justified in the context of a
free and democratic society. The Bill applies to all legislation past, present or
future.
Id., quoting CAN. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, § I.
24. CAN. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, § 2.
25. 1d. at § 7.
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). An exclusionary rule is afforded in Con-
Vol. 13
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Everyone has the right on arrest or detention: (a) to be informed
promptly of the reasons therefor; (b) to retain and instruct coun-
sel without delay and to be informed of that right; and, (c) to
have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas
corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.
27
An American lawyer might style section 15(1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms the Canadian Equal Protection
Clause, plus a touch of Frontiero v. Richardson:28
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.29
An American attorney might denominate section 15(2) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms the Canadian Bakke3"
Amendment:
Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvan-
taged individuals or groups including those that are disadvan-
stitution Act, 1982, § 24(2). Healy, Police interrogation and the charter of rights, Globe and
Mail (Toronto), Nov. 27, 1981, at 7, col. 1, 2.
27. CAN. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, § 10.
28. Four Justices of the United States Supreme Court (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and
White) in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-91 (1973), supported fourteenth amend-
ment strict scrutiny of sex discrimination cases, which scrutiny supposedly would have had
the effect of enacting the Equal Rights Amendment. For the purportedly inside story of the
Supreme Court's Frontiero decision, see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 253-55 (1979). The fourteenth amendment, of course, explic-
itly anticipates gender discrimination, even on the most sensitive matters in a republic, refer-
ring relative to the ballot to "male inhabitants" and (repeatedly) "male citizens." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
29. CAN. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, § 15(l). What an American attorney would style
the Canadian Equal Rights Amendment is § 28: "Notwithstanding anything in this Charter,
the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons."
The sex discrimination features of Canada's patriated Constitution triggered last-minute
controversy. Toronto Star, Nov. 4, 1981, at A17, col. I; Sheppard, supra note 16, at 1, col. 2.
The abortive twenty-sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, in controversy be-
tween its March 22, 1972, Senate passage and its June 30, 1982, extended ratification dead-
line, read:
Section I. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. The amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
S.J. Res. 8, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 9, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res.
208, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
30. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9
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taged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
31
Other portions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
dQms an American lawyer can easily identify with either specific
provisions of the United States Bill of Rights or with the type of
liberty generally guaranteed Americans via the Bill of Rights or the
fourteenth amendment:
8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search and seizure.
9. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or
imprisoned.
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right
(a) to be informed without unreasonable delay of the spe-
cific offence;
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time;
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings
against that person in respect of the offence;
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according
to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal;
(e) not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause;
(f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried
before a military tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury
where the maximum punishment for the offence is impris-
onment for five years or a more severe punishment;
(g) not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission
unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an
offence under Canadian or international law or was crimi-
nal according to the general principles of law recognized by
the community of nations;
(h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it
again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the of-
fence, not to be tried or punished for it again; and
(i) if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for
the offence has been varied between the time of commission
and the time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser
punishment.
12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment.
13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not
to have any incriminating evidence so given used to incrim-
31. CAN. CONSTITUTION AcT, 1982, § 15(2).
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inate that witness in any other proceedings, except in a
prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory
evidence.
14. A party or witness in any proceedings who does not under-
stand or speak the language in which the proceedings are
conducted or who is deaf has the right to the assistance of
an interpreter.3 2
It is not remarkable that the new Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms should appear to be substantially derived from the
American Bill of Rights,3 just as the latter derived in large part
from George Mason's Virginia Bill of Rights of June 12, 1776,"4
and even as the Virginia Bill of Rights appeared to be derived in
part from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. 31 But of what rele-
vance is the close resemblance between the new Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms on the one hand and the American Bill of
Rights and fourteenth amendment on the other?
IV. THOSE PARALLEL EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE/NOTWITHSTANDING
CLAUSES
Just as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms parallels
the United States Bill of Rights, the Notwithstanding Clause in this
new Canadian instrument parallels the Exceptions Clause of article
III, section 2. The Charter's section 33(1) provides:
Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly de-
clare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may
32. Id. §§ 8, 9, 11-14. An American lawyer might style § 26 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms the Canadian ninth amendment: "The guarantee in this Charter of
certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other
rights or freedoms that exist in Canada." Id at § 26.
33. "When the Constitution Act, 1982, is implemented, Canada will have a charter of
rights and freedoms that will be an integral part of its Constitution, like the Bill of Rights in
the United States. A constitutional amendment will be required to change it." Beaudoin,
supra note 21, at 5. On the other hand, the text thereof suggests that the new Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms directly derives from the strictly statutory 1960 Canadian
Bill of Rights. Bill of Rights, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 44 (1960); Hudon, The British North America
Act and the Protection ofIndividual Rights. The Canadian Bill ofRights, 9 VAL. U. L. REV.
273 (1975). (This former student of Professor Abel notes that Hudon styles the late, great Dr.
Albert Abel of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law "a Canadian." Id. at 300 n. 137.
But Abel then always had been an American, embracing Canadian citizenship only years
later.)
34. Polin, George Mason.- Father fthe Bill of Rights, THE FREEMAN, Dec. 1981, at 734,
736-37; B. MITCHELL & L. MITCHELL, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: ITS ORIGIN, FORMATION, ADOPTION AND INTERPRETATION 190-91 (1964).
35. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 223 (L. Perry ed. 1972).
11
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be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding
a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this
Charter.3 6
Should Congress choose to remove the relevant jurisdiction
from the federal judiciary, including the United States Supreme
Court, under the Exceptions Clause of article III, section 2, a state
supreme court becomes the ultimate arbiter therein of the still-
binding federal Constitution. Under the new Canadian Charter's
Notwithstanding Clause (section 33) each province, through a sim-
ple legislative enactment, can curtail the reach of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. No time-consuming litigation through the
provincial judicial system is required. Nor, for that matter, is any
preliminary enactment required of the federal legislature in Ottawa
corresponding to the article III, section 2, Exceptions Clause re-
striction of jurisdiction by the Congress. The Notwithstanding
Clause of the Canadian Constitution's new Charter allows, even
more obviously than does the Exceptions Clause, for a checker-
board constitutional protection of human rights. 37 The very week
36. CAN. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, § 33(l) (emphasis added). Section 33 continues:
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under
this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provi-
sion of this Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (I) shall cease to have effect five years
after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the
declaration.
(4) Parliament or a legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under
subsection (1).
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4).
Not dissimilarly, § 38(3) provides for opting out relative to subsequent constitutional
amendments:
An amendment. . . shall not have effect in a province the legislative assembly
of which has expressed its dissent thereto by resolution supported by a majority of
its members prior to the issue of the proclamation to which the amendment relates
unless that legislative assembly, subsequently, by resolution supported by a major-
ity of its members, revokes its dissent and authorizes the amendment.
Id at § 38(3).
37. However-and this is an innovation--the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, or the "carta canadiana," has what is known as a "notwithstanding"
clause applied to quite a few of its parts. These parts refer to fundamental rights,
legal guarantees and equality rights, except for women, where the "notwithstand-
ing" clause does not apply. Parliament and the legislatures, each acting in their
jurisdictions, can derogate from this Charter, provided that they expressly state in
their laws that they are doing so. Such derogation is valid only for five years. To
extend its duration, it is necessary to repeat the express declaration required by
section 33.
The fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of conscience and religion, free-
dom of the press and freedom of assembly are guaranteed, but there is a clause
under which it is possible to derogate from them. The same is true for the legal
rights.
Beaudoin, supra note 21, at 6.
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that Queen Elizabeth signed the Constitution Act, 1982, the govern-
ment of Quebec was preparing legislation to exempt Quebeckers
from some provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.38
V. PARALLEL "GO-IT-ALONE" ALTERNATIVES
A. 1981-1983 Canada
Interprovincial tensions indeed obtained in Canada immedi-
ately prior to the Constitution Act, 1982, just as interstate tensions
obtained in the United States immediately prior to the adoption of
the Constitution. It was reported on October 21, 1981, that Prime
Minister Trudeau had agreed to meet with the provincial premiers
in early November for "one final attempt" 39 to reach an agreement
on constitutional reforms. This offer to meet was part of a blunt
ultimatum from the Prime Minister to the provinces,4' Trudeau
warning that "it is evident to all of us, and to the Canadian people,
that the time has come when this issue must be settled once and for
all."'"
The resulting conference of November 2, 1981, in the words of
38. Beirne, The few who stayed out in the cold, MACLEANS, Apr. 26, 1982, at 36. But as
the University of Toronto Department of Political Economy's renowned Professor Peter H.
Russell has pointed out:
The effect of the legislative override in diminishing judicial power should not
be overestimated. Legislators who contemplate recourse to the notwithstanding
clause will face some powerful political disincentives. Experience with judicial in-
terpretation of statutes and judicial development of the common law demonstrates
how difficult it may be for a legislature to counter the policy fall-out of judicial
decisions. Access to the crowded agenda of modern legislatures is never easy and
may be especially difficult when influential groups have a vested interest in a posi-
tion adopted by the judiciary. In proposing a legislative override, [a] government
will be committing itself to a policy position which is almost bound to be labelled
by the media as "subverting civil liberties." This is bad politics, even for a govern-
ment with a clear legislative majority.
Russell, The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian Courts, 25
CAN. PUB. AD., Spring 1982, at 1, 19.
This Russell view is shared by Canada's Simon Fraser University Professor of Law
Edward McWhinney:
The possibilities of any premier's risking being characterized as a political "red-
neck" by moving to opt out of the charter, or parts of it, seemed exaggerated and
worth the prime minister's gamble. This part of the constitutional deal might also
operate affirmatively and educationally in terms of participatory democracy, by en-
couraging individuals and political action groups to get into the provincial political
process to make sure that their province should not bear the public shame of being
the only province to reject a Charter of Rights and human rights for its citizens.
E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 15, at 97.
39. Gray, PM agrees to meet premiers on Nov. 2, Globe and Mail (Toronto), Oct. 21,
1981, at 1, col. 1.
40. Id. at col. 2.
41. Id. at col. 3.
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University of Ottawa law professor Gerald A. Beaudoin, "was un-
like any other."42 At this conference, Prime Minister Trudeau
agreed that a provincial assembly could, via the Notwithstanding
Clause, derogate from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.43 The
provinces accepted a charter which they had initially rejected."
Nonetheless, friction continued, as indicated by the above-ref-
erenced plan of the Quebec government to invoke the Notwith-
standing Clause at once. Quebec Premier Rene Levesque
boycotted the April 1982 ceremonies with the Queen.45 An an-
ticonstitution demonstration in Montreal, organized by Premier Le-
vesque's Parti Quebecois, attracted some 25,000 marchers.46
Three hours before Queen Elizabeth arrived, the Quebec Pre-
mier had appeared on television to label the new Canadian Consti-
tution "the most soporific, legalistic document in the world."47 He
renewed his call for Quebec independence: "It's time for us to de-
cide that this Quebec should belong to us. . .as a country, a real
country"4 8; a country "where we'll really be at home."' 49 Nor was
this reaction idiosyncratic; alluding to the Constitution Act, 1982,
process, climaxing with Her Royal Highness' signature in Ottawa,
Quebec Vice-Premier Jacques Yvan Morin announced that "we are
42. Beaudoin, supra note 21, at 3.
43. "He also agreed that a legislator [sic: legislature] could derogate from the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms on the basis of a specific clause to be known henceforth as the
'notwithstanding clause.' This clause could apply to a number of sections in the Charter."
Id. at 3, 4.
44. Id. at 4.
To make a complex story short, Trudeau got the constitution patriated com-
plete with a bill of rights. But to do so he had to agree to permit the individual
provinces to nullify objectionable provisions. It would warm the heart of the late
John C. Calhoun: a provincial legislature can simply enact a measure providing
that Articles One, Four, Seven and Nine have no legal force in its jurisdiction.
Roche, Canada's Future, NAT'L REV., June 25, 1982, at 787.
45. Brecher, A Constitution--At Last, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 26, 1982, at 51.
46. A Symbol of Sovereignty, TIME, Apr. 26, 1982, at 41. "About 20,000 Quebeckers,
chanting (in English) 'Elizabeth go home,' answered nationalist calls to protest against the
patriation of the constitution." Beirne, supra note 38, at 36.
47. Brecher, supra note 45, at 51.
48. Id.
49. Beirne, supra note 38, at 36.
The Premier spat out English words to reinforce his contention that French-
speaking Quebeckers are isolated in Canada. He spouted phrases such as "le Ca-
nada Bill," "Ie BNA Act" and the PQ favorite "Pierre Elliott" with an innuendo-
laden pause before the more acceptable French "Trudeau" was added. The appeal
for racial solidarity included a dark warning that Trudeau would not be around
forever, but the "anglophone technocracy" that runs Canada is here to stay.
Id. Premier Levesque refers to the Canadian Constitution first affording her self-govern-
ment, this being a statute passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. British North
America Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3.
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It was not only the leadership of Francophone Quebec which
remained both unenthusiastic about the Canadian Constitution and
profoundly suspicious of Prime Minister Trudeau. Prince Edward
Island Premier Angus MacLean, during the week immediately fol-
lowing the crucial conference of November 1981, styled the accord
as "mostly negative for Prince Edward Island and not very advan-
tageous for average Canadians."' I Premier MacLean declared that
over the years he had learned of Prime Minister Trudeau: "He's
just the opposite of most men who achieve considerable power.
He'll kick a man when he's down."52
B. 1787-1791 America
Americans of the 1980s viewing the cleavages in Canada might
find the Notwithstanding Clause of the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms wholly comprehensible. Provinces so suspicious of centrali-
zation might, naturally, refuse to accept a Charter unless allowed to
"opt out." But did the United States constitutional adoption era
include any similar serious prospect of the thirteen states dividing
into two countries as today's ten-province Canada imaginably
could divide into a Dominion of Canada and a Republic of
Quebec?
American lawyers who deny the analogy of 1787 America to
1982 Canada overlook article VII of the United States Constitution,
which provides in full: "The Ratification of the Conventions of
nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitu-
tion between the States so ratifying the same."5 3 The plain language
50. Lewis, supra note 16, at 30. On the other hand:
According to a Gallup poll released today, 49 percent of Quebecers think the
new Constitution is "a good thing" compared to only 16 percent who believe it is
"not a good thing." The remaining 35 percent don't have an opinion one way or
the other.
The new Constitution was proclaimed April 17, after nearly two years of
heated debate and steady opposition from Levesque.
On the date of proclamation, Levesque led a protest march through the streets
of Montreal.
Levesque opposes the new Constitution because it guarantees minority lan-
guage education rights and it deprives Quebec of a veto over future amendments.
But today's poll indicates Quebecers are siding with Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau, the chief architect of the new Constitution.
49percent of Quebecers like our Constitution.- Poll, Toronto Star, June 19, 1982, at A2, col. 1.
51. MacLean still worries about constitution, Globe and Mail (Toronto), Nov. 9, 1981, at
10, col. 5.
52. Id.
53. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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of the United States Constitution anticipates the thirteen American
states dividing into a bloc of at least nine states under the 1787
Constitution and the remainder bloc continuing under the Articles
of Confederation. The foes of the 1787 Constitution, like George
Mason and Patrick Henry, did not need television to posit a polit-
ical destiny independent of the new federal Constitution; article VII
did this for them.
James Madison admitted in Number 43 of The Federalist pa-
pers that "no political relation can subsist between the assenting
and dissenting states."54 It could be suggested that Mason and
Henry's Virginia, with a fifth of the American population55 (Que-
bec contains a quarter of the Canadian population, and Canada's
largest city, Montreal), did not need the nation. Antifederalists
commanded a minimum of 60 percent of the Virginia popular
vote.5 6 (Quebeckers certainly disliked patriation of the constitution
without her consent.)
57
During the period for approval, the ninth state to ratify (New
Hampshire) did so on June 21, 1788,58 and the thirteenth state to
ratify (Rhode Island) failed to do so until May, 1790."9 The new
United States government had already commenced in March,
1789.60
To be sure, at least some sort of association may have obtained
between the initial nine ratifying states and the remainder sover-
eign states during the June 1788-May 1790 interval. This would
extend the analogy between the desires of some portions of contem-
porary Canada and the reality of early America. The Quebec-na-
tionalist Parti Quebecois, which was voted into power on
November 15, 1976, appealed to its populace (by a May 20, 1980,
referendum) to give the party a mandate to negotiate with the fed-
eral government in Ottawa. The negotiations would concern the
independence of Quebec, combined with a joint currency and com-
mon market relationship with Canada, styled "sovereignty-
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 226 (J. Madison)(M. Beloff ed. 1948).
55. B. MITCHELL & L. MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 146-47.
56. J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788, at
285-86 app. B (1961).
57. "Quebeckers clearly do not like the fact that the Constitution has been brought
home without their province's consent." Beirne, supra note 38, at 36.
58. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 419 (L. Perry ed. 1972).
59. Id. at 420.
60. Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820).
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL UNIT-VETO PARALLELS
Disputation in Canada over the Constitution Act, 1982, resem-
bled 1787-1791 controversy on another important matter as well:
The issue of one or another given unit's veto over adoption of the
new instrument. Post-1867 amendment of the Canadian Constitu-
tion by the British Parliament of the constitutional provisions deal-
ing with the provinces had in effect, although never formally, been
subject to veto by each of the Canadian provinces concerned.62
This helped shield Francophone Quebec from amendments disfa-
voring Canada's French-Canadian minority to the advantage of her
Anglophone majority.63
After the signing of the Constitution Act, 1982, Quebec as-
serted that the unanimous consent of the provinces was required
before there could be patriation or amendment of the Canadian
Constitution. Quebec claimed by convention the right of veto over
constitutional amendment.' Inasmuch as Prime Minister Trudeau
61. Beaudoin, supra note 21, at 2.
62. R. CHEFFINS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IN CANADA 12 (1976). Consistent
with the Cheffins view is Reference Re Amendment of Const. of Can. (Nos. 1, 2 & 3), 125
D.L.R. 3d I (Can. 1981). "A divided Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed the Trudeau
government's legal right to proceed with its plan to bring Canada's constitution home." Fox,
Judges throw constitutionalproblem back to politicians, Toronto Star, Sept. 29, 1981, at i, col.
4. "Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, armed with a Supreme Court ruling upholding the legal-
ity of his actions, says his government will press on with its plan to bring home Canada's
constitution." Fox, Each side says its a winner-Trudeau vows to press on, Toronto Star,
Sept. 29, 1981, at I, col. 2-3.
63. Apprehend the thinking attributed to John C. Calhoun:
What the federal system does is to refine democracy by requiring a concurrent ma-
jority. The majority will in each of its constituent parts, whenever the degree of
sovereignty assured those parts by the Constitution is called in question. To assert
this is not to support secession, but merely the essential principle of federal union.
F. MORLEY, FREEDOM AND FEDERALISM 65-66 (1959)(Morley's emphasis). As one Cana-
dian historical analyst discerns: "If John C. Calhoun's theory of concurrent majorities did
not succeed in the United States, it has worked in Canada even if few Canadians have heard
of it." Hutchison, Canada's Time of Troubles, 56 FOREIGN AFF., Oct. 1977, at 175, 183.
64. Beaudoin, supra note 2 1, at 6.
Quebec Liberal Leader Claude Ryan, .... was among those who did not at-
tend either the ceremonies in Ottawa or the protests in Montreal, although half of
his 43-member caucus did go to see the Queen. Ryan blames Trudeau for his role
in isolating Quebec, and the two men differ fundamentally over Ottawa's centralist
policies. But Ryan is also disappointed with Levesque, who, he says "badly de-
fended" Quebec's interests and ignored "unpardonably lightly" the province's right
to a veto. When Quebec signed a solidarity agreement with seven other provincial
premiers last April, the province's traditionally proclaimed--though legally ques-
tionable-right of veto was dropped. When the other provinces ganged up against
Quebec last November to accept Trudeau's package secretly, the province found
1983
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denied that any single province wielded such a veto, 65 the nine jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of Canada had to miss the royal procla-
mation on April 17 in Ottowa because they were scheduled to hear
Quebec's challenge thereto during June 1982.66
On November 25, 1981, Premier Levesque tabled an order in
council in the National Assembly (i.e., Quebec Legislature),
whereby the Quebec Cabinet attempted to veto the Trudeau gov-
ernment's constitution efforts. 67 In a cover letter to the Prime Min-
ister, Premier Levesque wrote that "[We] retain our traditional
right to a veto."68 Measure this supposed constitutional amend-
ment veto of Quebec with this plain language from article XIII of
the Articles of Confederation:
Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United
States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this
Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this
Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and
the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time
hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed
to in Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed
itself alone and at least psychologically weaker than ever before. Levesque was
widely blamed for bartering away the veto in the first place.
Beirne, supra note 38, at 36. "Quebec claimed a veto power, but the other provinces de-
murred, believing that Rene Levesque was practicing separatism, not bargaining in good
faith." Coxe, Beyond the Constitution, NAT'L REV., May 14, 1982, at 536.
65. Beaudoin, supra note 21, at 6.
The latest dispute inherent in a dual society must be set against the background of
one of the world's oldest written constitutions. It is a statute of the British Parlia-
ment, the British North America Act, which established Canadian self-government
in 1867 (and, incidentally, foreshadowed the Commonwealth of the twentieth cen-
tury). Though Canada has long been totally independent of Britain, with its own
separate monarch who happens to reside in London, only the British Parliament
can amend the constitution-and does so automatically, on the formal request of
the Canadian Parliament.
Over and over again Canadian governments, federal and provincial, have
sought to remove this fictitious but humiliating relic of colonialism and shift the
constitution from London to Ottawa. They have never succeeded because they
could never agree on a method of future amendment. Twice in the present genera-
tion an amending formula was drafted, accepted by all the English-speaking prov-
inces and, at the last moment, vetoed by Quebec.
Hutchison, supra note 63, at 183.
66. Lewis, supra note 16, at 32. On December 6, 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada,
which includes three Quebec justices, ruled unanimously that Quebec enjoys no veto upon
constitutional amendment. Quebec loses attempt to scuttle constitution, Evening J., (Wilming-
ton, Del.), Dec. 7, 1982, at A2, col. 5.
67. Johnson, Levesque 'veto' may be no laughing matter, Globe and Mail (Toronto),
Nov. 27, 1981, at 8, col. 2.
68. Id. "[Federal] Justice Minister Jean Chretien burst out laughing when he heard of
the 'veto.'" Id. Said Justice Minister Chretien: "He [Quebec Premier Rene Levesque] can
pass a decree if he wants that there will be no snow in Quebec this winter and it will have the
same effect." Ottawa laughs off Quebec 'veto,' Toronto Star, Nov. 26, 1981, at i, col. 5.
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by the legislatures of every state.69
Article XIII presented what Madison in Number 43 of The
Federalist papers conceded to be a question "of a very delicate na-
ture"7": "On what principle the Confederation, which stands in
the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superceded
without the unanimous consent of the parties to it?"'" Madison's
embarrassed reply may have been less than irrefutable.72
VII. CONCLUSION
University of Ottawa political scientist W. Andrew Axline, a
decade and a half ago at The Ohio State University, pronounced of
the study of international relations that "history is our labora-
tory."73 We unfortunately cannot, however, in Axline's example,
replay the Second World War with Italy omitted to learn the re-
sult.7 4 Yet in comparative constitutional law, where history also is
our laboratory, the United States 1787-1791 experiment of federal-
ism, complete with a Bill of Rights and Exceptions Clause, is being
replicated in 1981-1983 Canada; complete with a Charter of Rights
and Freedoms and a Notwithstanding Clause. It is for American
constitutional lawyers to learn therefrom.
A potentially vigorous congressional exercise of the Exceptions
Clause not only comports with the abstract imperatives of federal-
ism, but proves virtually to be one of the earmarks of federalism in
its real-world North American strain. The various framers of the
American and Canadian Constitutions seem to have allowed know-
ingly for such ai eventuality as a checkerboard constitution should
the federal power (especially judicial power) be abused. As Hamil-
ton discerned of the several powers of the federal judiciary in
Number 80 of The Federalist papers:
The amount of the observations hitherto made on the au-
thority of the judicial department is this: That it has been care-
fully restricted to those causes which are manifestly proper for
the cognizance of the national judicature; that in the partition of
this authority a very small portion of original jurisdiction has
been reserved to the Supreme Court and the rest consigned to the
subordinate tribunals; that the Supreme Court will possess an
69. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. XIII (emphasis added).
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 225 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff ed. 1948).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Address by W. Andrew Axline, The Ohio State University (Spring, 1968).
74. Id.
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appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, in all the cases
referred to them, but subject to any exceptions and regulations
which may be thought advisable; that this appellate jurisdiction
does, in no case, abolish the trial by jury; and that an ordinary
degree of prudence and integrity in the national councils will in-
sure us solid advantages from the establishment of the proposed
judiciary without exposing us to any of the inconveniences which
have been predicted from that source.
7 5
Hamilton recognized the need for a Supreme Court to pre-
clude a federalist hydraheaded monster, but Hamilton also realized
that the Exceptions Clause need spawn no such creature. Under
the Exceptions Clause, the American people as one acting through
its Congress identifies jurisdictional exceptions one by one. These
exceptions may be recalled if the state courts, like the Supreme
Court before them, run amok.
Absent an Exceptions Clause, the Supreme Court could check
the other two branches of the federal government while remaining
unchecked itself, thereby upsetting the balance between the three.
76
The Exceptions Clause does not render Congress the supreme fed-
eral branch of the three, but merely ensures that no federal branch
can go astray. The Exceptions Clause unremarkably allows Con-
gress to return the primary judicial role of protector of American
liberties from the Supreme Court, not to Congress, but to the state
judicial authorities. The framers could have found this a reassuring
and common sense policy; in 1787, the latter was, after all, the un-
threatening status quo.
A vigorous congressional exercise of the Exceptions Clause,
productive of a checkerboard constitution, need not lead to the ero-
sion of American liberties. Many United States attorneys may be
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 420 (A. Hamilton)(M. Beloff ed. 1948).
76. In the enthusiastic post-United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), recounting of
Professor Frank R. Strong: "In its function as official constitutional interpreter the judiciary
is not coequal with the other two branches but more than equal." Strong, Courts, Congress,
Judiciary.- One Is More Equal Than the Others, 60 A.B.A.J. 1203, 1206 (1974).
IThe Supreme Court of the United States not only possesses the traditional judicial
function assigned it under the tripartite division of governmental authority but, as
well, the awesome power to sit in judgement on the constitutionality of the acts of
itself, the executive branch, and the legislative branch. The source of this power
cannot, therefore, be found in separation of powers theory, grounded as this is on
the concept of equality. In the exercise of this distinctive function, the Court is not
coequal with the President and the Congress but more than equal.
Strong, President, Congress, Judiciary. One Is More Equal Than the Others, 60 A.B.A.J. 1050,
1051 (1974). But Professor Strong forgets that article IlI establishes the Supreme Court as a
supreme court; it is not a supreme branch of the federal government, grounded as separation
of powers theory is in the concept of equality.
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astonished to learn that until her 1982 Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, Canada's Constitution had no bill of rights whatsoever, as the
Trudeau government pointed out to its populace." Nonetheless,
Canada then, as now, has avoided tyranny. Americans frightened
of 1983 utilization of their Exceptions Clause need only turn their
eyes northward to find not a hydraheaded monster of federalist
chaos, but peace, order and good government.78
77. PUBLICATIONS CANADA, THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 1981: HIGHLIGHTS 2
(1981). The Trudeau government's public relations personnel had been long at work on
selling what would become the Constitution Act. Heller, Ad blitz on Constitution may be
launched soon, Toronto Star, Sept. 29, 1981, at A12, col. I.
78. Toronto journalist Robert Sheppard reported the Notwithstanding Clause as "pecu-
liarly Canadian . . . .To the best of anyone's knowledge [it does] not appear in the bill of
rights of any other country." Globe and Mail (Toronto), Nov. 7, 1981, at 12, quoted in
Friedenberg, Un-Canadian Activities, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 37, 38 (Nov. 4, 1982) (ellipsis
Friedenberg's). America's Exceptions Clause assuredly differs from Canada's Notwithstand-
ing Clause because the former allows legislative responses to a runaway federal Supreme
Court only through the federal legislature, with the resulting state-by-state checkerboard of
constitutional protections deriving merely from varied state supreme court interpretations of
yet-binding constitutional rights guarantees; the latter allows legislative responses to a run-
away federal Supreme Court through both federal and provincial legislatures, with the re-
sulting province-by-province checkerboard of constitutional protections deriving directly
from various legislative annulments of constitutional rights. Yet Sheppard misses the over-
riding point: both federal countries with central governments of divided powers afford ap-
peal by the people to political branches of their government for defense against a federal
Supreme Court run amok, this defense effectively resulting in a checkerboard constitution.
Canada's Notwithstanding Clause long was prefigured by America's Exceptions Clause.
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